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Abstract 
 
Unconditional altruism is an enduring puzzle for evolutionary approaches to social 
behavior. In this paper we argue that costly signaling theory, a well-established 
framework in biology and economics, may be useful to shed light on the individual 
differences in human unconditional altruism. Based on costly signaling theory, we 
propose and show that unconditional altruistic behavior is related to general 
intelligence. The cost incurred by engaging in unconditional altruism is lower for 
highly intelligent people than for less intelligent people because they may expect to 
regain the drained resources. As a result, unconditional altruism can serve as an 
honest signal of intelligence. Our findings imply that distinguishing altruistic behavior 
from cooperative behavior in social psychological and economic theories of human 
behavior might be useful, and that costly signaling theory may provide novel insights 
on various individual difference variables.   
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Introduction 
Altruistic behavior is difficult to reconcile with a Darwinian perspective. A 
behavior that reduces an individual’s fitness cannot survive the selective forces of 
natural selection. Indeed, as altruism appears to reduce an individual’s fitness, natural 
selection seems to predispose individuals to selfishness (Williams, 1992). Individuals 
need resources to survive and reproduce, therefore finite resources imply competition. 
Incurring a cost to help another organism does not seem to fit in the strict Darwinian 
framework. Many theories explaining various types of cooperation have been 
proposed in biology and economics (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Gurven, 2004) but 
unconditional altruism (defined as benefiting others at a cost to oneself, Wilson, 
1976) has remained elusive to date.  
The purpose of the present investigation was to provide a first step towards 
establishing the potential of costly signaling theory for increasing our understanding 
of altruistic behavior. In essence, we propose that altruistic behavior may serve as a 
costly signal of general intelligence. Before describing the specific studies, it may be 
helpful to review costly signaling theory. Costly signaling theory (CST; Grafen, 
1990a&b; Zahavi, 1975, 1997) explains how individuals use costly behaviors to 
convey information about themselves.  People may differ in the qualities that they 
possess, such as economic status or certain skills. These qualities are partially 
concealed, although others may be interested in this information, for instance in the 
process of selecting partners. These partners prefer an actor possessing a certain 
quality to an actor not possessing it. As a result, actors possessing an unobservable but 
desirable quality have an incentive to signal their quality to perceivers because 
perceivers are more likely to select them as a partner if they know their true type. 
However, actors not possessing the quality have an incentive to mimic the signal. 
Costly signaling theory provides a framework that explains how signals can be 
transmitted in a reliable way. Signal reliability is secured by making the signal costly 
and the signal-cost quality-dependent (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997). Quality-dependence 
of the cost reflects the characteristic that the cost is smaller for individuals possessing 
the quality than for agents lacking it. Only those possessing the quality can afford the  
quality-dependent cost that the signal entails. As a consequence of the quality-
dependent cost structure, the perceiver of the signal can be confident that the signaling 
actor has the underlying quality. For example: the purchase of a very expensive (i.e. 
the cost) piece of art provides the reliable information that the buyer effectively is   4
very wealthy (i.e. the quality). After all, someone lacking a huge amount of resources 
is simply not able to waste money on this kind of luxury products. 
 
Costly signaling theory and altruism 
The statement that altruism may serve as a costly signal has received theoretical 
support in anthropology, biology, and economics (e.g. Boone, 1998; Gintis, Smith & 
Bowles, 2001; Lotem, Fishman & Stone, 2000; Roberts, 1998; Gurven, 2004). 
Empirical support for the theory is beginning to emerge. Anthropological fieldwork 
(in a Meriam community, living on islands off the northeast tip of Australia) 
investigated the typical profile of men who provided turtles for a feast, which is 
considered as an altruistic act because it is costly for the providers (Bliege Bird, Smith 
& Bird, 2001). The research showed that success at hunting (and hence the ability to 
provide the feast) depends on several qualities of the hunter such as e.g. his 
environmental knowledge, strength, leadership skills, and organizational skills. As the 
amount of food that a hunter can provide is reliably related to these skills, altruism 
may serve as a costly signal of those underlying abilities (Bliege Bird et al., 2001; 
Smith & Bliege Bird, 2000). Experimental work showed that participants may 
compete by means of altruism to signal trustworthiness (Barclay, 2004). 
Altruistic behavior is costly by definition. However, it is less clear what quality 
altruistic behavior might be related to. Although unequivocal evidence for the link is 
still missing, some authors mentioned the possibility that altruism is related to 
intelligence and others reported data that seem consistent with our claim. We now 
turn to a brief review of that literature.  
As mentioned above, Bliege Bird et al. (2001) found that some men of the Meriam 
spend their time turtle-hunting, which requires specific valued skills of the hunter. As 
hunting turtles is a relatively costly way of collecting food, it may serve as a costly 
signal of underlying qualities. Bliege Bird et al. (2001) proposed that problem solving 
ability as one underlying quality that is needed to be successful at hunting: Hunters 
with higher cognitive skills should be more successful at capturing turtles as they 
know better where they can find turtles, how exactly to catch them, etc. Providing 
turtles for a feast (an altruistic act) may serve as a signal for this underlying quality as 
the lower quality hunters are expected to fail more often on a hunt than high-quality 
individuals and as a consequence would not have the same success in providing 
turtles. Accordingly, unpublished data by Dewitte and De Cremer (2005) showed that   5
students who had contributed much to group assignments had higher grades than 
those who contributed their fair share or less than their share. Furthermore, Van Vugt, 
Roberts and Hardy (forthcoming) recently suggested that altruism might signal 
intelligence as it may take brainpower to appreciate the long-term benefits of 
cooperation.  
In addition, Glazer and Konrad (1996) provided evidence that alumni’s sponsoring 
of their former college qualifies as a costly signal of wealth. As children’s intelligence 
predicts later socio-economic success better than parents’ attributes (Gottfredson, 
1994), Glazer and Konrad’s finding is consistent with our claim that altruism and IQ 
are related. We assume that intelligent people are better able to acquire resources. As 
a consequence, donating part of these resources is relatively less costly for highly 
intelligent people even before these resources are acquired. Our claim that altruism is 
a costly signal of the underlying quality intelligence allows us to predict a relationship 
between intelligence and altruism. 
 
Study 1 
We hypothesize that someone who is acting altruistically is more intelligent than 
someone acting cooperatively or egoistically. However, in typical public good games 
altruism and cooperation are indistinguishable. Either players can choose from only 
two options (cooperation or not), or giving more than the appropriate amount (i.e. 
altruistic act) does not make much sense. Millet and Dewitte (2006) slightly adapted 
the public good game in such a way that cooperative and altruistic behavior can be 
differentiated. We adopt the same methodology in this study. 
Method 
One hundred seventy-six undergraduates at a large European University (60 
women and 113 men) aged between 18 and 27 year participated. The monetary 
reward depended on their performance (minimum of 5 euro).  
We organized a repeated public good game with four players, similar to the 
procedure by Millet and Dewitte (2006). Decisions were made simultaneously and 
involved contributing a certain amount to the provision of a public good. At the 
beginning of each round, all participants received an endowment of 40 points. In each 
round, they had to decide how much of the endowment they would invest in the 
public good or keep for themselves. Every point was worth 3.39 eurocent. All the 
points that were invested, were subtracted from their 40 points endowment. If the   6
good was obtained (100 points, i.e. the provision point), 160 points were distributed 
equally across the four players in that round, irrespective of individual contributions.  
Upon arrival, each participant was assigned to a computer in a partially enclosed 
carrel. Participants neither saw nor talked to each other. They believed that they 
played a game involving six people, but in reality they played against the computer.  
Participants were told that four of the six participants were players in the game, and 
that two others were observers of the game. The observers did not play themselves. 
They were told that the roles of player and observer could change during the game.  
All participants started, allegedly by random selection, as an observer. They twice 
observed that the good was not obtained. The shortage was 5 (out of 100) points in the 
first round and 2 points (out of 100) in the second. They did not receive information 
about individual contribution levels. After the first two rounds, participants replaced 
one person in the game and decided how much they invested in the public good. As 
the group had twice failed to reach the public good, the third round was a very 
uncertain situation in which the outcome was highly unpredictable. We distinguished 
three behavioral categories, defined in relation to the fair contribution level of 25 
points, i.e. the provision point divided by the number of players. Participants could 
contribute either exactly (i.e. cooperative decision), less  (i.e. egoistic decision), or 
more than the fair share (i.e. altruistic decision). We measured participants’ decisions 
(cooperative, egoistic or altruistic) in the first round that they played (i.e. the third 
round of the game). The game ended after the third round.   
Measures of General Intelligence.  
Appromixately 20 minutes after the game, participants received a computerized 
short-version of Raven Advanced Progressive Matrices IQ - test (RPM) (adapted from 
Verguts and De Boeck, 2002). They had to solve as many problems as possible in 15 
minutes. A recent review showed that the RPM-test is one of the best measures of 
general intelligence (Gray & Thompson, 2004). We predict a higher score on this test 
for the altruists than for the others.  
Additionally, participants were assessed on a simple (SRT) and four-choice (CRT) 
reaction time task before the game. The procedure was similar to that used by Deary, 
Der and Ford (2001), except for the fact that our task was administered on computer. 
In SRT, digits were presented with varying interstimulus intervals (1-3 s) and 
participants had to press an assigned key as fast as possible. In CRT, one of four 
possible digits was presented with varying interstimulus intervals (1-3 s). Each digit   7
was linked to one key. Participants had to press the corresponding key as fast as 
possible when a digit was presented. Each digit appeared 10 times in randomized 
order.  Eight practice trials were presented before the actual reaction time task. There 
were 20 trials for the SRT and 40 for the CRT task. Means and standard deviations 
were obtained for both tasks, based on correct responses only. Because CRT is more 
strongly related to intelligence than SRT in the high range of the IQ continuum (Der 
& Deary, 2003), we predicted the relation of altruism with CRT to be stronger than 
with SRT (as our sample consists of university students).  
Results and discussion 
Four participants were not considered for analysis because they did not comply 
with  instructions. Of the remaining 169 participants 68 acted egoistically (42 men, 26 
women), 59 cooperatively (41 men, 18 women) and 42 altruistically (26 men, 16 
women). A two (Sex) by three (Public Goods Choice) factorial Anova revealed that 
RPM score (M = 30.46, SD = 7.22) was significantly affected by a main effect of 
Public Goods Choice (F (2, 163) = 3.27, p < .05, η² = .04). Altruists (Maltruistic = 33.07, 
SDaltruistic = 6.80) scored higher on the RPM than egoists (Megoistic = 29.84, SDegoistic = 
7.08; p < .07) and cooperators (Mcooperative = 29.32, SDcooperative = 7.33, p < .02) (see 
Figure 1). There was no difference between egoists and cooperators (p = .38).
1 The 
analogous analysis showed a significant effect of Public Goods Choice on CRT (M = 
524.03, SD = 74.38; F (2, 163) = 3.26, p < .05, η² = .04). Altruists (Maltruistic = 499.74, 
SDaltruistic = 79.10) reacted faster than egoists (Megoistic = 525.14, SDegoistic = 63.11; p < 
.04) and cooperators (Mcooperative = 540.03, SDcooperative = 79.45; p < .02) (see Figure 2). 
There was no difference between egoists and cooperators (p = .62). Sex did not have 
any effect. No other significant effects emerged (all p’s > .10). For SRT, no effect 
emerged (F (2, 163) = 0.66, p = .517; see Figure 3). This study shows that those 
people opting to behave altruistically in the public good game were more intelligent, 
as measured by two well-established but relatively independent measures of general 
intelligence (relation between both: r = -.14, p = .07). The fact that the simple reaction 
time was not faster among altruists, rules out the possibility that altruists were just 
more motivated to help the experimenter.  
 
                                                 
1 Consistent with Abad, Colom, Rebollo, and Escorial (2004) we found that men scored significantly 
higher than women (F (1, 163) = 7.54, p < .01), presumably because of the test’s visuo-spatial nature. 
No other significant effects emerged (p’s > .10).   8
Study 2 
To rule out the concern that the altruistic choice in the public good situation may 
partially result from self-interested motives, we conducted a follow-up study to 
investigate the link between a genuine pro-social motivation and general intelligence 
as measured by the RPM. We adapted Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, and Joireman’s 
(1997) Social Value Orientation measure and added a fourth option to each choice 
situation that reflected the altruistic option. That option maximizes joint outcome 
rather than own outcome (see also Eek and Gärling, 2005).  
Method 
One hundred twenty-five undergraduates at a large European University (80 
women and 45 men) aged between 17 and 28 year participated in exchange for a 
participation fee. Standard instructions were given that valuable points had to be 
distributed between oneself and an other person. One had to imagine that the other 
person was someone they had never met and that they would never meet again. 
Afterwards participants got nine different choice situations (see Appendix). These 
situations were similar to the following one: 
     A      B      C      D  
You  get  500   500   550   500 
The  other  gets   100   500   300   550 
 
Alternatives A, B and C are identical to the options in the items of the original 
Social Value Orientation measure of Van Lange et al. (1997). Option A maximizes the 
difference between oneself and the other (maxdif); option B minimizes the difference 
between oneself and the other (mindif) and option C maximizes the own outcome 
with disregard for the other’s outcome (maxown). We added option D, where the joint 
outcome is maximized at the cost of inequality in the advantage of the other 
(maxjoint). This last option is similar to the one adopted by Eek and Gärling (2005). 
Our extended version was preprogrammed on computer and for each choice situation 
(9 in total) we asked participants to rank order the attractiveness of the four 
alternatives (1 = most attractive; 4 = least attractive option). Afterwards we summed 
the nine ranks for each of  the four social motives and reversed the scores for clarity, 
so that high scores mean high levels of the motive. In that way we obtained values for 
4 different variables that we called maxjoint (cfr. D), mindiff (cfr. B), maxown (cfr. 
C), maxdif (cfr. A).    9
Results and discussion 
Scores on the maxjoint variable were separated into three groups based on the 
lower (below percentile 33.3), middle and upper (above percentile 66.6) thirds of the 
distribution. Two participants were not considered for analysis because they did not 
comply with instructions. In line with literature, we focused only on the ‘high’ and 
‘low’ maxjoint group and left out the middle group for analysis (see e.g. Giesler et al., 
1996). Therefore, 78 participants remained for statistical analysis. In line with our 
hypothesis, we found that the RPM score (M = 29.62, SD = 5.58)  was higher for the 
high than for the low maxjoint group (Mhigh = 30.90, SDhigh = 5.43; Mlow = 28.36, 
SDlow = 5.57; F (1, 74) = 4.34, p < .05, η² = .06). There was no effect of gender nor of 
the interaction between gender and maxjoint group (all p’s > .10). In a similar manner 
we distinguished between a high and low group on the maxown, mindif and maxdif 
variables. Raven IQ-scores did not differ between the high and low groups for the 
maxown and mindif variables (all F’s < 1). However, we found that the average 
raven-IQ score was marginally higher for the low than for the high maxdif group 
(Mhigh = 28.28, SDhigh = 5.82; Mlow = 29.93, SDlow = 4.55; F (1, 79) = 5.23, p < .08, η² = 
.04).  
In this study, we found evidence for a positive relationship between intelligence 
and a genuine pro-social motivation, namely maximizing the joint outcome even at 
the cost of inequality in the advantage of the other. This motivation is very similar to 
the altruistic behavior in study 1 because in that situation, giving more than the fair 
share implies giving more than most others, and hence ending up with less than the 
others. We found no relation between intelligence and the traditional normative pro-
social motivation, namely minimizing differences between contributors (Van Lange et 
al., 1999). We also found no relation between intelligence and the individualistic 
orientation (maxown), which is inconsistent with the explanation of the results of 
study 1 in terms of self-interest. Instead, we found a slight negative relationship 
between intelligence and self-interested motivations that maximize the relative 
advantage at the cost of the joint outcome. 
 
Discussion 
The results of studies 1 and 2 indicate a consistent pattern of findings. We find 
support for a positive relationship between intelligence and altruistic behavior. In the 
first study, we found that those who contributed more than their fair share to a public   10
good were more intelligent, as measured by two relatively independent measures of 
general intelligence. In the second study, we showed that those who possess a 
dispositional tendency to value joint benefits more than their own, scored higher on an 
intelligence test.  
The evidence presented supports the possibility that unconditional altruism may 
serve as a costly signal of general intelligence because altruism is costly and is 
reliably linked to the quality ‘general intelligence’. Consistent with the finding that 
children’s intelligence predicts later socio-economic success better than parents’ 
attributes (Gottfredson, 1994), we assume that intelligence is an indicator of future 
resources. As a consequence, someone with high cognitive skills may be able to 
donate more in advance than someone with lower skills. As such, the cost of altruistic 
behavior could be quality-dependent. This finding and the theoretical approach we 
provide opens up various avenues for future research.    
A first opportunity for future research lies in the further exploration of the role of 
altruism in mate selection. Pro-social behavior in men appears to be a desirable trait 
for women (Jensen-Campbell, Graziano, & West 1995). Intelligence also seems to be 
one of the most important criteria for both genders in choosing partners (Li, Bailey, 
Kenrick & Linenmeier, 2002). Future research may look at whether altruism is a 
desirable mate characteristic for its own sake (e.g. predicting care), whether it is 
attractive because it signals intelligence, or both.  
Our theoretical approach focused on the ultimate cause of the relation between 
general intelligence and altruistic behavior. Specifically, we claimed that altruism 
functions as a costly signal of general intelligence. A second opportunity for future 
research therefore lies in the investigation of the proximate cause of the link between 
general intelligence and altruism. Our second study already suggests that general 
intelligence is related to a genuine pro-social motivation. These motives may trigger 
emotional reactions to an opportunity to act altruistically, such as empathy or feelings 
of responsibility which may lead to the altruistic act itself. It is also possible that high 
levels of intelligence allows people to take a broader perspective on their decisions 
(Vallacher and Wegner, 1987). This may help them go beyond the pursuit of 
immediate gratification, which often coincides with egoistic behavior (Dewitte & De 
Cremer, 2001).   
The search for proximate causes also points at the possible role of intervening 
variables. A third opportunity for future research is the search for third variables that   11
have been shown to be related to both intelligence and altruism. Leadership is a 
possible candidate. Van Vugt (in press) reviewed evidence showing that generosity 
and leadership are related and that leaders’ social skills are better developed than 
those of followers. Moreover, Bass (1990) reviewed evidence that intelligence and 
leadership are positively related. Combined with these insights, our data point at an 
interesting possibility: general intelligence may explain part of the relation between 
leadership and generous behaviors.  
The possibility that intelligence may explain the relation between leadership and 
generosity opens up a fourth avenue for future research. We submit the hypothesis 
that altruism may be a costly signal of general underlying fitness, including not only 
intelligence but also leadership status and health. Remarkably, leadership and health 
are associated: leaders’s health is better than that of followers (Van Vugt, 
forthcoming). In addition, Brown et al. (2003) found that providing support to the 
spouse, friends, relatives and neighbors predicted mortality in a sample of married 
elderly: those giving support had lower mortality risk (controlled for current health 
and degree of support received). Although the authors concluded that providing 
support to others benefits health, their data are also consistent with the costly 
signaling framework: providing support may be a costly signal of fitness. Several 
recent lines of research indeed support the suggestion that intelligence may be closely 
linked to general fitness. First, a link between general intelligence and longevity was 
shown by Deary and Der (2005). This link was found for two diverse measures of 
intelligence: A reaction times task and a classical psychometric intelligence test, and 
did not depend on social class, education, or smoking status. Second, Prokosch et al. 
(2005) recently showed that body symmetry - a general fitness indicator – is also 
positively related to scores on a Raven Progressive Matrices Test.  In their vision, 
general intelligence and body symmetry tap into and underlying “fitness factor” and 
this underlying fitness indicator may explain the relation between intelligence and 
longevity among others. So, the findings of Prokosch et al. (2005) may suggest a 
positive relationship between general fitness indicators (different from general 
intelligence) and altruism. In that way, altruistic behavior may serve as a general 
fitness indicator and not only as indicator for general intelligence.  
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Appendix 
 
       A   B   C   D 
(1)  You        480 540 480 480 
  Other       80  280  480  540 
 
     A    B    C  D 
(2)  You        560 500 500 500 
  Other      300 500 560 100 
 
     A    B    C  D 
(3)  You        520 520 520 580 
  Other      520 580 120 320 
 
     A    B    C  D 
(4)  You        490 500 560 490 
  Other      560 100 300 490 
 
     A    B    C  D 
(5)  You        490 560 500 500 
 Other       90  300  500  560 
 
     A    B    C  D 
  (6) You    570 500 500 500 
  Other    300 500 570 100 
 
     A    B    C  D 
  (7) You    510 510 510 560 
  Other    510 560 110 300 
 
     A    B    C  D 
  (8) You    500 500 550 500 
  Other    550 100 300 500 
   20
     A    B    C  D 
  (9) You    480 540 490 490 
  Other    100 300 490 540 